Protect your closing funds from wire fraud

Establish trusted contacts before payment is due

At the beginning of the closing process, agree with your closing representative how payment instructions will be delivered and verified. Independently establish the office telephone number and keep it in your own records. Do the same for your bank's fraud or wire department through the bank's official channel.

Ask who is authorized to answer funding questions and what to do if that person is unavailable. Planning this early avoids a last-minute choice between missing a deadline and trusting an unexpected message. If someone proposes a different process later, pause and verify the change using your established contact details.

Verify the instructions through a separate channel

Before wiring funds, speak with your trusted representative using the number you previously established, or verify in person. Confirm the payment instructions through that independent interaction. Do not use a telephone number, link or attachment supplied only in the payment email you are trying to check. The CFPB's closing-scam guidance emphasizes this separation.

An incoming phone call does not automatically provide independent confirmation either. If you cannot establish who is calling, end the call and contact the office through your trusted number. Avoid sharing account information or verification codes in response to an unsolicited request. A message that uses an existing subject line still needs the same verification.

Treat urgency and changed details as reasons to pause

Warning signs include a new bank account, a claim that normal staff are unavailable, pressure to keep the request secret, a request to bypass the normal process, or a domain name that differs slightly from the real one. The absence of these signals does not prove a message is safe.

For example, a hypothetical message arrives shortly before closing saying the company has changed banks and funds must be sent immediately to keep the appointment. Do not reply asking whether it is real: the person controlling the message can answer. Call the established office number and verify the request separately before taking any payment action.

Protect the communication accounts too

Use strong, unique passwords and enable multifactor authentication on accounts that support it. Be cautious with attachments and links, including messages that appear to ask you to log in to view closing instructions. The FBI recommends multifactor authentication and careful review of addresses and payment requests. FBI prevention guidance.

Keep financial statements, identification and closing documents within the secure channel your team has verified. Do not paste bank details into a general website inquiry, social message or public review. Ask the closing representative to identify the correct system before uploading sensitive material; a professional-looking portal alone is not proof of ownership.

If money may have been diverted, act immediately

Contact your bank or wire-transfer provider immediately, explain that the transfer may be fraudulent and request urgent action, including a recall and contact with the receiving institution. Report the incident to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center. These are the immediate channels identified by the FBI and CFPB; do not wait for the next scheduled closing update.

Notify the real closing team using your trusted number. Preserve the messages, transfer confirmation and other evidence for the bank and authorities without forwarding sensitive information broadly. Fast action matters, but recovery is not guaranteed. Be wary of anyone who promises to recover the funds for an upfront payment.

When you prepare for a purchase closing, review this process with everyone contributing funds. Then use the cash-to-close guide and closing-day checklist to organize the amount and appointment separately from payment verification.